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ETHICAL SCREENS IN THE MODERN AGE
Matthew Lenhardt*
I. INTRODUCTION
Today attorneys work in a profession that is rapidly
changing, both economically and in terms of professional
culture. The United States continues to cope with a
devastating recession. In December 2009, the national
unemployment rate was at an astounding 9.7 percent.' Of
the 14.9 million Americans who were unemployed as of
February 2010, 1.13 million were previously employed in the
legal services industry.2 Within the professional culture,
lateral movement of attorneys has become more prevalent
over the last twenty years.3 As firms merge and dissolve,
attorneys increasingly move laterally between firms.4 This
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University School of Law; B.S., Music Business, Hofstra University. Special
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1. Household Data Historical, Employment Status of the Civilian
Noninstitutional Population 16 Years and Over, 1970 to Date,
http://www.bls.gov/web/cpseeal.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
2. Brian Baxter, Unemployment Rate Falls, But Legal Sector Still
Contracting, AM. L. DAILY, Aug. 7, 2009, httpJ/amlawdaily.typepad.com/
amlawdaily/2009/08/unemployment-rate-falls-but-legal-sector-still-contracting.
html; see also Debra Cassens Weiss, 21,000 Legal Jobs Lost in Last Year, A.B.A.
J., Mar. 6, 2009, httpJ/www.abajournal.com/news/article/4200_legal-staffers_
lostjobs-in februaryabor-statsshow (stating that in February 2009, the
legal industry lost 4,200 jobs and that overall legal employment declined from
1,154,400 in January 2009 to 1,150,200 in February). Legal services industry
includes attorneys, paralegals and other law staffers. Karen Sloan, Legal
Services Industry Trims 1,100 Jobs in October, LAW.COM, Nov. 19, 2008,
httpJ/www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202426127113.
3. See Robert J. McGahan & Amy Harman Burkart, ABA, Recognize
Reality, LAW.COM, Feb. 16, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?
id=1202428218936&slreturn=l&hbxlogin=1.
4. Id. In 2007, nearly 2,500 partners moved to or from one of the 200
largest private firms in the United States. Leigh Jones, ABA May Amend
Ethics Rules on Conflicts, LAW.COM, Feb. 2, 2009, httpJ/www.law.com/jsp/
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trend has become even more common as layoffs force
attorneys to change firms.5 These two developments have
caused its members to advocate for change, particularly in
the ethical rules that govern attorney conduct.6
The area of conflicts of interest, specifically dealing with
the use of ethical screening of lateral attorneys, is an area of
particular concern.7 In 2009, the American Bar Association
(ABA)' amended rule 1.10 of its Model Rules of Professional
Conduct to allow ethical screens 9 when attorneys move
between private sector firms. 10  California, however,
continues to march to the beat of its own drummer by not
explicitly allowing for screens in its rules of professional
conduct.'" Rather, the decision of whether to allow screening
has been left largely to California courts, which have not yet
article.jsp?id=1202427915603. That figure was a 12.5 percent increase from
2006, when 2,153 partners moved to or from the top 200 private firms. Id.
5. Erik Wittman, A Discussion of Nonconsensual Screens as the ABA Votes
to Amend Model Rule 1.10, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1211, 1217-18 (2009).
6. See, e.g., Carole J. Buckner & Robert K. Sall, Ethically Speaking: Is
Screening on the Horizon in California, 50 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 44 (2008).
7. See McGahan & Burkart, supra note 3.
8. The ABA, founded in 1878, is a voluntary bar association consisting of
members of the legal profession that is not specific to any United States
jurisdiction. See A.B.A., About the A.B.A., http://www.abanet.org/about/.?gnav=
global aboutjlead (last visited April 3, 2010). The ABA's most important
activities are the setting of academic standards for law schools, and the
formulation of model legal codes. Id.
9. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct defines "[sicreened" as
"isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely
imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the
circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to
protect under these Rules or other law." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.0(K) (2002) (amended 2009).
10. Jeffrey B. Tracy, Model Rule 1.10 Amendments Affect Lateral Moves,
A.B.A. LITIG. NEWS, Feb. 26, 2009, httpJ/www.abanet.org/litigation/
litigationnews/top-stries/model-rule-1.10.html. With regard to attorneys
moving to and/or from government offices, the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct were amended in 1983 to allow the use of screens in relation to such
movement. See infra Section III.B (discussing the ABA's decision to allow for
screening in the context of government employment); see also Wittman, supra
note 5, at 1220-21.
11. STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 10-11 (Aspen Publishers
8th ed. 2009) (1943) ("California's Rules of Professional Conduct borrown
modestly from the ABA Model Rules, but much of it contains provisions unique
to that state."). "To date, California is the only state]] that does not have
professional conduct rules that follow the format of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct." American Bar Association-Center for Professional
Responsibility, httpJ/www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html (last visited
Jan. 29, 2010).
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recognized screening in all contexts. 12  As a result, many
migrating attorneys in California who need a job or seek to
migrate laterally between firms are left without recourse. 13
This article will examine the current state of the law and
how the law addresses the use of ethical screens for lateral
attorneys. Section II provides a background of the basic
conflicts of interest rules as set forth in both the California
Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Rules of
Professional Conduct. 14 Section III analyzes both the ABA's
and California's position on the use of screens in the context
of both the public and private sectors. 15  This section also
discusses whether or not California should and will evolve to
be consistent with the ABA and other jurisdictions that allow
screening. 16 Section IV sets forth two recommendations for a
California rule on screening.' 7 Finally, Section V concludes
that California should follow the ABA's lead in allowing for
screening in the private practice context, but not at the
expense of destroying the attorney client relationship.'8
II. BACKGROUND
A. General Conflict of Interest Rules
A conflict of interest arises when there is a "substantial
risk that the lawyer's representation of the client would be
materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own interest
or by the lawyer's duties to another current client, a former
client, or a third person." 9 Thus, a conflict may arise when a
12. Buckner & Sall, supra note 6, at 46.
13. See id.
14. See infra Part II. Although divergent in many respects, the California
Rules of Professional Responsibility and the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility are similar in terms of general conflict of interest rules for
purposes of this article.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (2000).
Although this paper primarily discusses conflicts of interest between two
clients, the rules also discuss conflicts between an attorney and his or her client,
including prohibiting an attorney from entering into business transactions with
clients, such as making or negotiating an agreement giving the attorney literary
or media rights to a portrayal based in substantial part on information relating
to the representation. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a), (d) (2002).
1347
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
lawyer simultaneously2 ° or successively represents two or
more clients with adverse interests.2 1 Two competing policies
have shaped the rules that govern conflicts of interest.22 The
right of a party to employ the counsel of his or her choice is
balanced against the legal profession's desire to preserve the
public's confidence in the judicial system.23
1. Simultaneous and Successive Conflicts of Interest
A simultaneous or "concurrent" conflict occurs when:
The representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client; or there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of
the lawyer. 24
This rule preserves the attorney's duty of loyalty to the
client. 2' This is worthy of preservation because attorneys
have a duty to maintain undivided loyalty and trust to their
clients and also to avoid undermining public confidence in the
legal profession.26
Conversely, Model Rule 1.9(a) defines a successive
conflict of interest as: "[a] lawyer who has formerly
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent
another person in the same or a substantially related matter
in which that person's interest are materially adverse to the
interests of the former client."27 Here, the Model Rules seek
to maintain client confidentiality.28  The purpose of
preserving client confidentiality is "ensur[ing] the right of
every person to freely and fully confer and confide in one
having knowledge of the law, and skilled in its practice, in
order that the former may have adequate advice and a proper
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY R. 3-310(c) (1992) (amended 2009).
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9; CAL. RULES OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY R. 3-310(e).
22. See GILLERS, supra note 11, at 213.
23. See id.
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1)-(2).
25. Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 955 (Cal. 1994).
26. See People ex rel. Dep't of Corp. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys, Inc., 980
P.2d 371, 378 (Cal. 1999).
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a).
28. Flatt, 885 P.2d at 954.
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defense."29
In California, when ruling on a motion to disqualify
counsel for a conflict,30  the courts apply different tests
depending on the nature of the conflict. 31 For simultaneous
representation, courts apply a more stringent test.32 Because
a key foundation of the attorney client relationship is loyalty
and trust, a client who learns that his or her lawyer is also
representing an adversary, even in a wholly unrelated
matter, will not likely have the same level of confidence and
trust in the legal system let alone his or her counsel.3
Consequently, although two matters may have nothing in
common and there is no risk that confidences from one case
will have any relation to the other, disqualification may
nevertheless be required. 4
Conversely, for successive representations, the court will
ask whether there is a "substantial relationship" between the
subjects of the former and current representation.35 This
29. SpeeDee Oil Change, 980 P.2d at 378 (quoting Mitchell v. Superior
Court, 691 P.2d 642, 646 (Cal. 1984)).
30. "A trial court's authority to disqualify an attorney derives from the
power inherent in every court" to control the conduct of its officers in the
furtherance of justice. Id. "The paramount concern [is to] preserve the public
trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar.
The important right to counsel of one's choice must yield to ethical
considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our judicial process."
Id.
31. All Am. Semiconductor, Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., No. C 07-
1200, 2008 WL 5484552, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2008).
32. Flatt, 885 P.2d at 955.
33. Id.
"Something seems radically out of place if a lawyer sues one of the
lawyer's own present clients [o]n behalf of another client. Even if the
representations have nothing to do with each other, so that no
confidential information is apparently jeopardized, the client who is
sued can obviously claim that the lawyer's sense of loyalty is askew."
Id. 955-56 (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.3.2
(West 1986)) (emphasis in original).
34. Id. (stating that "in all but a few instances, the rule of disqualification in
simultaneous representation cases is a per se or 'automatic' one."). There are,
however, exceptions to this rule, such as where the attorney engaging in
simultaneous representation of clients with adverse interests in unrelated
matters provides full disclosure and both clients agree in writing to waive the
conflict. Id. at 956 n.4.
35. City & County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc., No. A107148,
2005 WL 3008770, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2005). "Successive
representations are substantially related where... '[the] information material
to the evaluation, prosecution, settlement or accomplishment of the former
representation given its factual and legal issues is also material to the
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
substantial relationship test balances two interests that are
often at odds in such a context: "the freedom of the
subsequent client to counsel of choice,... and the interest of
the former client in ensuring the permanent confidentiality of
matters disclosed to the attorney in the course of the prior
representation." 36 Where a substantial relationship between
the subjects of the prior and the current representation is
found, courts will presume that the attorney had access to
confidential information from the first representation and the
attorney in the subsequent matter must be disqualified.37
2. Vicarious Disqualification
"When a conflict of interest requires an attorney's
disqualification from a matter, the disqualification normally
extends vicariously to the attorney's entire law firm. "38
Model Rule 1.10(a) states that "[wihile lawyers are associated
in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client
when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9. "19  This "'vicarious
disqualification rule is based upon a doctrine of imputed
knowledge' which posits that the knowledge of one attorney in
a law firm is the knowledge of all attorneys in the firm."40
This doctrine recognizes that lawyers who practice law
together in a professional organization share each other's
confidential information.41  Moreover, the vicarious
disqualification rule safeguards clients' legitimate expectation
that their attorneys will protect their confidences, thus
preserving the public's confidence in the legal profession.42
evaluation, prosecution, settlement or accomplishment of the current
representation given its factual and legal issues.'" All Am. Semiconductor, 2008
WL 5484552, at *5 (quoting Jessen v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 111 Cal. App. 4th
698, 713 (2003)).
36. Flatt, 885 P.3d at 954.
37. Id.
38. People ex rel. Dep't of Corp. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d
371, 374 (Cal. 1999); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2002).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a).
40. In re Charlisse C., 194 P.3d 330, 339 (Cal. 2008) (quoting Adams v.
Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 86 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 1333 (2008).
41. SpeeDee Oil Change, 980 P.3d at 383-84.
42. City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 4th 17, 24
(2004).
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3. Waiver of Conflicts
Disqualification, however, is not always required when
an attorney conflict of interest arises.43 Because the values of
confidentiality and loyalty are for the client's benefit, an
attorney is permitted to continue the conflicted
representation if "full disclosure is made and both clients
agree in writing to waive the conflict."44 Notwithstanding
informed consent, however, a lawyer may not represent a
client if: (1) the representation is prohibited by law; (2) one
client asserts a claim against the other in the same litigation;
or (3) in the circumstances, the lawyer does not reasonably
believe that he or she will be able to provide adequate
representation to one or more of the clients. 4  Therefore,
regardless of waiver, an attorney may never represent two
clients who are adversaries in the same litigation.46
III. ANALYSIS: SCREENING
Should a lawyer's conflicts from a previous employer
disqualify all the members of his or her new firm? This
question has caused considerable debate over the years,
especially now that the economy has forced law firms to
downsize and merge, resulting in an increase in involuntary
lateral movement of attorneys.47 In addition, restrictions on
43. Sharp v. Next Entm't, 163 Cal. App. 4th 410, 429 (2008) ("[Alutomatic
disqualification is not required in all circumstances where representation of one
client creates actual or potential conflicts of interests with another client. .. .")
44. Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 956 n.4 (Cal. 1994); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 (2000); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-
310(A)(2) (1992). "In order for there to be valid consent, clients must indicate
that they 'know of, understand and acknowledge the presence of a conflict of
interest.'" Sharp, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 429 (quoting Gilbert v. Nat'l Corp., 71
Cal. App. 4th 1240, 1255 (1999)). As defined in the ABA Model Rule 1.0(e),
informed consent "denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of
conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and
explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to
the proposed course of conduct." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e).
45. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1)-(4).
46. See id. R. 1.7(b)(3). See also SpeeDee Oil Change, 980 P.2d at 379
(stating that "[tihe most egregious conflict of interest is representation of clients
whose interests are directly diverse in the same litigation. Such patently
improper dual representation suggests to the clients-and to the public at
large-that the attorney is completely indifferent to the duty of loyalty and the
duty to preserve confidences.").
47. See Cassandra Melton, Model Rule 1.10: Imputation of Conflicts and
Private Law Firm Screening, A.B.A LITIG. NEWS, 2009,
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attorney mobility also affect the interests of clients because
their choice of lawyer is limited.
The debate harkens back to the balancing of the two
fundamental values that shape conflict of interest rules: (1)
the need to preserve the public's confidence in the judicial
system and client's expectations of loyalty and confidentiality,
and (2) allowing clients to employ the counsel of their
choice.4" In the context of screening, however, the freedom of
attorneys to choose their career path is also balanced.49
Given that California and the ABA are somewhat
incongruent with respect to their rules of professional
conduct,50 it is not surprising that both have somewhat
divergent positions with respect to the use of ethical screens.
A. The ABA's Position
1. History of Screening
The ABA first addressed screening in 1983 by formally
adopting Model Rule 1.11. 51 This rule allowed for screening,
but only when lateral attorneys moved between the
government and private sectors. 52 That same year, the ABA
further extended the use of screening to instances where
private law firms hired former judges, judicial law clerks,
arbitrators, mediators, or other third party neutrals with
Model Rule 1.12. 53 In the years following the adoption of 1.11
and 1.12, there was no evidence that screening of government
attorneys led to disciplinary actions or breaches of
confidentiality. 54
Additionally, as of 2009, twenty-three states already
allowed the use of ethical screens in the private attorney
http:l/www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/triaLskis/pretrial-model-rule-
110.html; see also McGahan & Burkart, supra note 3.
48. See GILLERS, supra note 11, at 213.
49. See Wittman, supra note 5, at 1218 (suggesting that a rule which
presumes communication between a lateral attorney and his or her new law
firm about previous clients restricts lawyer mobility because the clients
preferred counsel is disqualified).
50. GILLERS, supra note 11, at 10-11.
51. Wittman, supra note 5, at 1219-20.
52. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.11 (2002).
53. Id. R. 1.12. In 2002, the ABA amended Rule 1.12 to include the
reference to an arbitrator, mediator, or other third-party neutral in Model Rule
1.12(a). Buckner & Sail, supra note 6, at 44.
54. Melton, supra note 47.
1352 [Vol:50
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context. Within these states, there is no evidence that
screening had been unable to protect client confidentiality or
that the lateral attorney had engaged in litigation adverse to
his former client despite the use of a screen.56 These positive
experiences, coupled with the intent to seek uniformity in the
law throughout the nation, prompted members of the legal
profession to wonder whether the ABA should reconsider its
position on screening in the private sector.57 It was not,
however, for another sixteen years that the ABA would be
willing to extend the use of screening to private sector
attorneys.58
2. Amendment 1.10
On February 16, 2009, the ABA's House of Delegates
59
voted 226-191 to amend Model Rule 1.10 to permit screening
when an attorney moves from one private law firm to
another.6 ° In approving the amendment, the ABA noted that
a driving purpose behind the rule was to achieve "uniformity
in the ethical principles adopted nationwide."61 Also, it noted
that such a change was necessary because, as a result of law
firms downsizing and the decreasing number of new job
opportunities, lateral movement by attorneys was
increasingly involuntary.62 In formulating the amended rule,
the ABA sought to balance the former client's interest in
confidentiality and loyalty against the attorney's freedom to
55. ROBERT H. MUNDHEIM, STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT ON RECOMMENDATION FOR
AMENDMENT OF RULE 1.10 9 (2009), httpJ/www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/
midyear/daily-journal/Adoptedl09.doc.
56. Id. at 15.
57. See generally Melton, supra note 47.
58. Id.
59. The House of Delegates is the policy-making body of the association. It
is vested with the control and administration of the ABA and action taken by
the House of Delegates on specific issues becomes official ABA Policy. American
Bar Association, http'//www.abanet.org/leadership/delegates.html (last visited
Jan. 30, 2010).
60. GILLERS, supra note 11, at 331. The ABA Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility proposed a substantially similar change
at the 2008 Annual Meeting that was postponed for subsequent consideration
due, in part, to the late introduction of significant amendment proposals.
MUNDHEIM, supra note 55, at 10. After careful consideration of the submitted
amendments, the Committee issued a new discussion draft for comment on
September 18, 2008. Id.
61. MUNDHEIM, supra note 55, at 15.
62. See id. at 11.
1353
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choose his or her career path and the subsequent client's
interest in having the counsel of choice. 3  Under the
amended Model Rule 1.10, a firm is not required to obtain the
former client's consent to enact an ethical screen.' The rule
does, however, provide for several safeguards to ensure the
screen is effective and to provide greater protection to the
former client.65
Model Rule 1.10 requires that the conflicted attorney or
his or her former law firm represented a client, and the
attorney's new firm represents another client in the same or a
substantially related matter.66  The purpose is simple-
imputation only occurs where a lateral attorney has a
conflict.67 Thus, if the subsequent matter was not the same
or substantially related to the prior matter, then the lateral
attorney can directly represent the subsequent client,
regardless of imputation. 6' Further, assuming substantial
relation, the conflicted attorney must be "timely screened
from any participation in the [conflicted representation]."69
Timely screening ensures that confidential information does
not reach the members of his or her new law firm.7 °
Additionally, the disqualified attorney must not be
apportioned any part of the fee from the matter. 71  This
ensures that the new attorney will not have a financial
incentive to disclose confidential information.72
As amended, Model Rule 1.10 provides certain procedural
safeguards that must be followed in order to establish an
effective screen.73  The rules require five steps. First, the
firm must provide the client with prompt written notice to
ensure compliance with Model Rule 1.10 as well as a
63. Id.
64. MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2002).
65. See id.
66. Melton, supra note 47.
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a) (stating that "[wihile
lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a
client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so
by Rules 1.7 or 1.9"). Therefore, if an attorney would not be conflicted under 1.7
or 1.9, then no other attorney at the new firm would be either. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id. R. 1.10(a)(2)(i).
70. See Wittman, supra note 5, at 1216.
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1. 10(a)(2)(i).
72. Wittman, supra note 5, at 1223.
73. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a)(2)(i).
[Vol:501354
2010] ETHICAL SCREENS IN THE MODERN AGE
description of the screening procedures in place.74 Second,
the firm must provide the former client with "a statement of
the firm's and the screened lawyer's compliance with [Model
Rule 1.10].""7 Third, the firm must provide the former client
with a statement that review of the screen may be available
before a tribunal.76 Fourth, the firm must agree "to respond
promptly to any written inquiries or objections by the former
client about the screening procedures."77 Lastly, amended
Model Rule 1.10 requires that the firm provide the former
client with certifications of compliance with the rule and the
procedures at reasonable intervals of time.7" The purpose of
these safeguards is to assure the former client that his or her
previous attorney has not breached his or her duty of
confidentiality and/or loyalty. 79 Therefore, with amended
Model Rule 1.10 the ABA has sought to balance the former
client's expectation of loyalty and confidentiality and the
public's confidence in the profession, against the attorney's
career choice, and the interest of subsequent clients to the
counsel of choice.8 °
By amending Model Rule 1.10, the ABA made significant
progress towards accomplishing its goal of creating
uniformity of national law. The screening rules in the
twenty-three states that allow screening are fairly consistent
with the amended Model Rule 1.10, with some variance. For
example, Ohio's version of Model Rule 1.10 permits screening
of a lateral attorney only if the attorney did not have a
substantial role in the matter.81  The ABA Committee
rejected such a requirement, 82  concluding that
74. Id. R. 1.10(a)(2)(ii).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. R. 1.10(a)(2)(iii).
79. Melton, supra note 47.
80. Id.
81. OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c)-(d) (2007). See also ARIZ.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(d)(1) (1996); COLO. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.10(e) (2008); MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(d)-(e)
(2000) (amended 2009); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (b) (2005)
(amended 2007); NEV. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(e) (2006) (amended
2010); N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b) (2006); TENN. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT RR. 1.10(c)-(d) (2008); WIS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR
ATTORNEYS SCR. 20:1.10(a) (2007).
82. MUNDHEIM, supra note 55, at 14.
1355
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disqualification adequately protects a client's interest in cases
where the amount of material confidential information
possessed by a lateral "lawyer raises legitimate doubts about
the efficacy of screening."8 3 Additionally, some believe that
such a requirement would be too unworkable and vague to
help law firms decide whether or not to hire a lateral
attorney.' In contrast, some states have set less stringent
standards than Model Rule 1.10. For example, Illinois Rules
of Professional Conduct 1.10(b)(2) allows for the use of
screening without requiring the law firm to notify the former
client of the screen.
8 5
Lastly, the ABA's Standing Committee's report further
provides that disqualification motions can still protect former
clients in exceptional cases.8 6 The report states:
[I]f a substantial number of lawyers on one side of a
litigation move to the law firm representing the other side,
a tribunal might disqualify the other side's law firm,
because it would be reasonable to doubt the efficacy of
screens established for so many lawyers who possess so
much material confidential information. 87
Therefore, the ABA allows for parties to continue bringing
disqualification motions in instances where the facts of a
given case suggest that the screen will not properly protect a
former client's interest of confidentiality and loyalty.88
3. The Great Debate
The amendment to Model Rule 1.10 caused a heated
debate. Critics of the amendment argue that it tips the
balance too far in favor of attorneys .89 Further, it may cause
clients to question their attorneys, leaving them less
forthcoming during their representation. 90 Also, it may cause
the general public to question the legal profession as a
83. Id.
84. Id. at 14 n.6.
85. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b)(2) (2010). See also MD.
LAWYER'S RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c) (2005); MICH. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.10(b) (2002).
86. MUNDHEIM, supra note 55, at 12.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. Buckner & Sal, supra note 6, at 46-49.
90. Id.
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whole. 91 As a result, opponents argue that the amendment
signals a deterioration of the fabric that holds together the
profession.92 This may be particularly the case where an
attorney changes firms during the course of ongoing
litigation. 13  In such an instance, the attorney may have
literally switched sides and stand adverse to his or her
previous client in the same matter. "
The Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, however, foresaw such an instance. It stated
that "[elven if in a rare case the lead lawyer in a litigation
moves to the opposing party's law firm, the court may
disqualify that firm rather than authorize it to screen the
disqualified lateral lawyer." 9 Therefore, the ABA meant for
disqualification motions to still be used in situations where it
is reasonable for the "former client to fear that a screen may
not be effective."96  Additionally, supporters of the
amendment assert that, although screening may weaken the
attorney client relationship in some ways, prohibiting the use
of ethical screens could also destroy the relationship by
depriving parties to the counsel of their choice. 97
Another issue in this debate involves how ethical screens
will affect smaller firms. 9 With smaller firms, the opponents
who argue that screening will not be effective have a stronger
position. Attorneys in smaller firms are likely to have closer
contact with other lawyers in the firm.99 Therefore, screening
is less likely to be effective1 °° than in larger firms where
contact between attorneys is easier to prevent because they
generally have more resources to detect conflicts and erect a
more effective screen. 10 This contrast is sharpened by the
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Wittman, supra note 5, at 1217.
94. Id. (stating "clients will justifiably fear the use of their confidences
against them, because now the lawyer owes a duty of loyalty to her new clients,
must zealously represent them, and must communicate all information to them
during the course of the representation").
95. MUNDHEIM, supra note 55, at 11.
96. See id.
97. Wittman, supra note 5, at 1218.
98. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
DATABASE § 18:23 (2009).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (reasoning that "[liarger firms search for possible conflicts when
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fact that larger firms are typically broken into numerous
offices and divisions which allow the firm to better ensure
that the conflicted lateral attorney did not have contact with
the firm members working on the matter. 1
02
Taking into consideration not only the size of the new
firm but also the size of the previous firm can add another
dimension to the analysis. For instance, imagine that a
lateral attorney did not directly work on any conflicting
matters while employed with his or her previous firm yet a
colleague at the previous firm did. Under Model Rule 1.10,
that other attorney's conflict would be imputed onto the
lateral attorney. In such a situation, if the previous law firm
was small, then it is more likely that even if the lateral
attorney did not personally work on the matter, he heard the
other attorneys discussing it or maybe even stumbled upon
some related documents in the office hallways. 10 3 Therefore,
where the previous firm is small, with only one office, it is
more likely that the lateral attorney has at least some
information about the case. Consequently, the former client
is somewhat justified in feeling that their information is
unsafe, notwithstanding the timely institution of screening
mechanisms at the new firm. 1
04
Now, imagine that the previous firm has multiple offices
that span the nation or the world. Also, imagine that the
colleague was working on the conflicting matter in the Berlin
office, but our lateral attorney always worked in the San
Francisco office. 105 Here, it does not seem fair to disqualify
his new firm because his former colleague, who worked at a
distant location, was the source of his conflict.'016 There is
little chance that the lateral attorney ever spoke with any
member of his previous firm about the former client's matter,
let alone ever spoke with or met the colleague with the
original conflict. Thus, larger firms tend to give a reason for
a screening rule whereas smaller sized firms tend to show
hiring lawyers and typically use sophisticated computer systems").
102. Id. Certain considerations include whether the size and structure of the
firm can sufficiently isolate the conflicted attorney to safely minimize the risk of
contact. Id.
103. See State ex rel. Consenza v. Hill, 607 S.E.2d 811, 816 (W. Va. 2004).
104. Id. at 817.
105. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518
F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
106. Id. at 753-54.
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that effective screening can never truly accompany the former
client's interests.
B. California's Position
California diverges drastically from the ABA and other
states with respect to its rules of professional responsibility
because it tends to be more protective of client
confidentiality. 10 7 Because confidentiality is a central pillar
supporting the rules governing conflicts of interest, it is not
surprising that California has not formally adopted screening
provisions for either public or private attorney movement.'0 8
Similarly, California's Rules of Professional Conduct are
silent on vicarious disqualification of attorney conflicts within
a firm.l0 9 As such, the development of rules pertaining to the
use of screens and imputation has been left to the courts. "o
1. Government Attorney Migration
California, like most jurisdictions, permits screening for
government attorneys who move between the public and
private sectors. In Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, the
appellate court examined whether screening was permissible
for an attorney who moved from a private firm to the city
attorney's office in the midst of a concurrent
representation."' There, the Stensons' family home
sustained flood damage.1 2 In bringing suit against the City
of Santa Barbara, the Stensons retained the firm of Hatch &
Parent to represent them." 3 One Hatch & Parent attorney
named Sarah Knecht had performed over thirty hours of legal
107. See GILLERS, supra note 11, at 38. California's Business and
Professional Code states that a California attorney has a duty "[tio maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the
secrets, of his or her client." CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)(1) (2009)
(emphasis added).
108. All Am. Semiconductor, Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., No. C 07-
1200, 2008 WL 5484552, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2008).
109. Henriksen v. Great Am. Sav. & Loan, 11 Cal. App. 4th 109, 114 (1992).
110. See id. (stating that "[tihe California Rules of Professional Conduct do
not specifically address the question of vicarious disqualification, and for that
reason the vicarious disqualification rules have essentially been shaped by
judicial decisions").
111. Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 4th 17, 22 (2004).
112. Id. at 21.
113. Id.
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services for the Stensons." 4  During the course of
representation, Ms. Knecht informed Hatch & Parent that
she had accepted a job in the city attorney's office, which was
simultaneously defending the city against the Stensons'
suit. 115
The city, informed of the conflict, constructed an ethical
screen to prevent Knecht's access to any information,
documents, or other materials related to the Stensons'
litigation.1 6 The issue was whether the use of such a screen
could prevent the vicarious disqualification of the entire city
attorney's office.' 7 No California court had ever allowed
screening where an attorney had direct, personal knowledge
of the former client's confidences and now works for the
client's direct adversary during pending litigation."1
8
Nevertheless, the court held that the ethical screen was
permissible. 1 9 The court noted that "public sectors attorneys
have the same ethical duties of confidentiality and loyalty as
their" private sector counterparts.' 20  It held, however, that
the interests at stake were different and thus the rules
governing vicarious disqualification of a public law office
should also different.'
2
'
In discussing these differences, the court first noted that
unlike private sector attorneys, public sector attorneys do not
114. Id. The work that Ms. Knecht had performed for the Stensons
represented about forty-percent of the total time billed by Hatch & Parent for
the matter. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. The measures taken by Janet McGinnis, the assistant city attorney
responsible for the litigation, included instructing everyone in the office to
prevent Knecht from being involved in communications about this case or
having access to any records or documents related to the case. Id. Further
Knecht did not have access to any of the filing cabinets containing the litigation
files. Id.
117. Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 4th 17, 24 (2004). The
court noted that if the case involved a private law firm the answer would be
clear that Knecht's disqualification would be mandatory and would extend to
her entire law firm. Id. However, it noted a difference in the instant case
because Knecht was employed by a public law office and not a private law firm.
Id.
118. The Santa Barbara court took note of several cases that have accepted
the use of ethical screens for public lawyers who did not personally work on the
matter in which the conflict was raised. See People v. Christian, 41 Cal. App.
4th 986 (1996); Chambers v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 3d 893 (1981).
119. Santa Barbara, 122 Cal. App. 4th at 27.
120. Id. at 24.
121. Id.
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have a financial interest in the matters that they work on. 122
Accordingly, private sector attorneys have less of an incentive
to breach client confidences. 123  Next, the court noted that
public sector attorneys do not recruit clients or accept fees,
and thus have no incentive to favor one client over another. 1
24
Further, it stated that vicarious disqualification in the public
sector imposes unique burdens on the affected public entities,
attorneys, and clients. 125  It noted that, without the use of
screening, public law offices would have trouble recruiting
competent attorneys. 126  Individual private sector attorneys
may be hesitant to accept public sector jobs that may limit
their future career opportunities in the private sector due to
conflicts. 12
7
In addition, the court reasoned that because
disqualification issues raise costs, this may affect public
sector entities even more than private sector entities. 128 It
may force public sector entities to be driven more by financial
considerations than by the public interest that they are
meant to uphold. 129  Finally, clients whose interests are
adverse to a public entity may be deprived of their chosen
counsel, or find it difficult to retain counsel at all. 1
30
Therefore, even in a situation where an attorney who
directly represented the former client becomes that client's
adversary in the same matter, the courts are willing to accept
screening in the public sector. 131  Because of the
aforementioned reasons, courts feel that, although a former
client's expectation of loyalty may be shattered along with
public confidence in the profession, the balance tips in favor
of attorney migration and allowing parties to have access to
the counsel of their choice. 132  However, notwithstanding
these interests, there are certain contexts where the courts
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 4th 17, 24
(2004).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 24-25.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 24.
131. See City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 4th 17, 24
(2004).
132. See id.
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have not allowed for screening in the public sector.
In an unpublished decision of City and County of San
Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc., the California Court of
Appeals for the First District held that screening in the public
sector was not appropriate given the specific facts of the
case. 3 4  While in private practice, Dennis Herrera
represented the defendants Cobra and Telecon. 13
5
Subsequently, Herrera began working as the head of San
Francisco's Office of the City Attorney. 136 The city began a
fraud investigation and eventually filed suit against
defendants. 137 The defendants then moved to disqualify the
entire city attorney's office because Herrera obtained
confidential information relating to the defendant's
business. 13  In response, the city argued that although
Herrera was disqualified from the subsequent representation,
the city attorney's office as a whole should be able to continue
to represent the city in the matter because it had properly
constructed an ethical screen. 3 9
Unlike Knecht from Santa Barbara, Herrena was the
head of the city attorney's office. 140 As such, the court held
that the use of an ethical screen was not adequate and the
entire office was vicariously disqualified.14 ' It reasoned that,
where the disqualified attorney is the head of a public law
office, special concerns are raised that even a properly
instituted screen cannot sufficiently address.4 4 As the head
of the city attorney's office, Herrera had the authority to set
agency policy and to influence the decisions made by those in
the office that handled the matter. 4 3 Specifically, the court
acknowledged that:
133. San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc., No. A107148, 2005 WL 3008770
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2005).
134. Id. at *5.
135. Id. at *1.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc., No. A107148, 2005 WL 3008770,
at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2005).
140. Id. at*1.
141. Id. at *5.
142. Id. at *4 (citing Younger v. Superior Court, 77 Cal. App. 3d 892, 897
(1978) (holding that vicarious disqualification of an entire district attorney's
office was required).
143. Id. at *5.
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At the intersection of law and politics, where this head of
office case lies, the preservation of the public trust in the
scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of
the bar must be the paramount concern.. . The stakes are
too high for the ... citizens who deserve [the politician's]
unwavering loyalty, and for the former clients who trust
him to maintain their confidences.144
The Cobra court ruled that public confidence in the judicial
system outweighed the attorney's ability to move laterally
into new employment when the lateral attorney was in a
position of power within the public entity, and thus subject to
greater public scrutiny. 145 In a subsequent opinion, however,
the California Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding
Cobra, "an ethical screen might suffice to shield a senior
supervisory attorney with a personal conflict and thus avoid
vicarious disqualification of the entire government legal unit
under that attorney's supervision. " 146  Thus, the California
Supreme Court has signaled its willingness to permit
screening in public sector cases where the lateral attorney
assumes a position of authority in the public entity. 147
2. Private Attorney Migration
In California, the use of ethical screens in the private
sector has not yet been judicially accepted. 148 The cases that
have considered the issue have held, without exception, that
no matter how impenetrable such a screen may appear, law
144. Id. The court went on to note that [rieasons exist to support a
narrower disqualification rule in public sector cases, but those reasons are
insufficient when the City Attorney himself is the disqualified attorney. An
ethical screen alone cannot suffice here. The City Attorney cannot screen out
all his responsibilities for setting office policy and reviewing the performance of
his attorney staff." Id.
145. San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc., No. A107148, 2005 WL 3008770,
at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2005).
146. In re Charlisse C., 194 P.3d 330, 342 (Cal. 2008). The court laid out
three factors a trial court should analyze when determining a motion to
disqualify a public supervisory official in a government office, including (1) his
or her actual duties with respect to those attorneys who will be screened, (2) his
or her responsibility for setting office policies that may affect subordinate
attorney's decisions in handling the conflicted representation, and (3) whether
public awareness of the case is likely to cause doubt to be cast upon the
integrity of the governmental law office. Id.
147. See id.
148. All Am. Semiconductor, Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., No. C 07-
1200, 2008 WL 5484552, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2008).
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firms cannot avoid disqualification by instituting an ethical
screen. 149  At least in some instances the courts have
considered the criticism of these decisions, but have not been
willing to fully accept the use of screening. 15
0
Two California district court opinions from December
2008 acknowledge a slow and steady shift in California
towards accepting screening in the private sector.' 5' In All
American Semiconductor, Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor, Inc.,
the court considered the defendant's motion to disqualify
attorney John Vandevelde and his firm Crowell & Moring
LLP from representing the plaintiffs.'52  Vandevelde
represented defendant Infineon Technologies' Vice President
of Sales, Gunter Hefner, in an investigation by the
Department of Justice and in a related civil matter. 15
3
Vandevelde's representation in the civil matter was limited to
preparing Hefner for a deposition.'54 While still representing
Hefner, Vandevelde's firm merged with Crowell, which was
representing the plaintiffs. 15  The defendant's requested
Crowell to withdraw as counsel because Vandevelde joined
Crowell after representing Hefner in prior litigation
substantially related to the current litigation.'56 In response,
Crowell decided to erect an ethical screen to protect against
the inadvertent disclosure of confidential information by
Vandevelde to other members of the firm. 5 7
After finding that Vandevelde was disqualified because a
substantial relationship existed between his representation of
Hefner and Crowell's representation of plaintiffs, 5 ' the court
149. Id.
150. See id. at *1; Plumley v. Doug Mockett & Co., No. CV 04-2868, 2008 WL
5382269, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2008).
151. All Am. Semiconductor, 2008 WL 5484552, at *1; Plumley, 2008 WL
5382269, at *1.
152. All Am. Semiconductor, 2008 WL 5484552, at *1.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at *2.
156. Id. at *3.
157. Id. Crowell issued an Ethics Wall Notice which directed Vandevelde
and other members of Vandevelde's previous firm, Lightfoot Vandevelde, to not
discuss or share with anyone at Crowell any confidential information they may
have received from their representation of Hefner. Id.
158. All Am. Semiconductor, Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., No. C 07-
1200, 2008 WL 5484552, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2008) (stating that "it is
undisputed that Vandevelde received confidential information from Infineon in
the course of his representation of Hefner that is material to plaintiffs' claims in
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considered whether Crowell had instituted a screen that was
sufficient to prevent disqualification of the entire firm. 159 The
court began by noting that the rule in California is that when
an attorney is disqualified from representing a client the
attorney's entire firm must also be disqualified as well,
regardless of efforts to erect an ethical screen. 160
Nonetheless, the court acknowledged that the law in
California was likely headed towards allowing screening in
the private attorney context. 161 In doing so, it reasoned that
given the realities of today's legal climate with increased
attorney mobility and frequent mergers of law firms,
mandatory vicarious disqualification may be both unfair and
unnecessary in some cases. 162  In the absence of any
controlling authority to the contrary, the court ruled that
Crowell was disqualified in its entirety. 163
In Plumley v. Doug Mockett & Company," the second
2008 district court case, the Central District of California
considered a motion to disqualify, but there, it had to
determine whether the defense's expert Gerald Mossinghoff
and defendants' lead counsel Miles & Stockbridge should be
disqualified. 165  In deciding whether the firm should be
disqualified, the court cited an opinion from the Ninth Circuit
that stated "the California Supreme Court was 'sending a
clear signal' . . . that it would accept ethical screening of
conflicted lawyers rather than demand strict disqualification
of the entire law firm." 66 Nonetheless, the court went on to
rule that the screening procedures used were not effective,
and thus disqualification of the entire firm was in order.167 In
this litigation, and because Vandevelde recently joined Crowell . . . the
circumstances here are analogous to one of successive representation").
159. Id. at *8.
160. Id. (citing Hitachi, Ltd. v. Tatung Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1164 (N.D.
Cal. 2006) (holding that established law in California rejects the use of ethical
screens).
161. Id. at *9.
162. Id.
163. Id. at*12.
164. Plumley v. Doug Mockett & Co., No. CV 04-2868, 2008 WL 5382269, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2008).
165. Id. The court held, over defendant's objections, that the imputation rule
could apply to an expert witness for disqualification purposes. Id. at *3.
166. Id. at *2 (citing In re County of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir.
2000)).
167. Id. at *3.
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doing so, however, the court never explicitly rejected the use
of ethical screens. 168 Rather, it narrowly held that in the
present case, even assuming that screening was permitted,
the defendant's did not undertake effective screening
mechanisms. 169
C. Will California Evolve?
California's state bar has a Rules Revision Commission
that is charged with evaluating the current California Rules
of Professional Conduct. 17o One of its primary objectives is to
eliminate and avoid unnecessary differences between the
California rules and the ABA Model Rules. 171  In order to
accomplish this objective, it seems likely that the Rules
Revision Commission will propose a rule that would allow for
some type of screening for private attorneys. This seems to
be a good idea because lateral employment changes are more
prevalent in the legal profession and attorneys are not
restricted to strict state boundaries in their practice.' 72 In
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. The State Bar of California, Commission for the Revision of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, httpJ/calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar-generic.jsp?cid=
10129 (last visited Feb. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Commission for the Revision].
The Commission's work is a multi-year project. The last effort of the
Commission began in 1985, with initial action by the Supreme Court in
1989 adopting the revised rules and further action of the Court in 1992
adopting supplemental revisions to the rules. The process entails:
1. The Commission developing its initial work product;
2. That work product being considered by the Board's Committee
on Regulation and Discipline ('CORD');
3. That work product being developed and circulated for public
comment;
4. The results of the public comment being evaluated and
incorporated into the Commission's work product;
5. The Board of Governors adopting the final work product and
recommending adoption of by the California Supreme Court;
6. Submission of the State Bar's recommendations to the
Supreme Court;
7. And the Supreme Court's deliberative process and final action
on rule revisions.
The State Bar of California, Commission for the Revision of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, Background, http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar
generic.jsp?cid=10129&id=1101 (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
171. Commission for the Revision, supra note 169.
172. See OSBA SPECIAL COMMITTEE, AM. BAR ASSN, REPORT OF THE OSBA
SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE (MJP) (2001),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/mjp-comm_osba.html.
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fact, today, an attorney can practice nationally and even
internationally. 173 Therefore, it makes sense for California to
adopt a similar screening provision to that of Model Rule 1.10
in order to eliminate uncertainty for out-of-state attorneys
who practice in California.
Given the current state of both the profession and the
economy, it seems that it is only a matter of time until ethical
screens in the private sector are permitted in California. One
of the reasons that the ABA was ready to implement
screening in 2009 was because of the present economic
situation. 174 Lawyers are no longer moving between firms for
their own economic incentive; they have been forced to leave
and seek new employment. 175 This is particularly significant
in California, where the state unemployment rate as of March
2010 was 12.6 percent, significantly higher than the national
average. 176 Therefore, California should allow for the use of
ethical screens, either by judicial determination or
amendment to the California Rules of Professional Conduct.
IV. PROPOSAL
In the event that California is prepared to adopt a
screening rule for private attorneys, then what should that
rule require? One solution would be for California to adopt
all of the provision of Model Rule 1.10. This conforms with
the Rules Revision Committee's objective of making the
California Rules consistent with the national standard as
possible. 177  But, given how protective California is of the
attorney client relationship, it also seems likely that
California would want further protections in its rule to
protect a client's confidences.
One way to provide additional protection would be to
require informed written consent from the former client. If
the former client refused to consent, then the screen would
not be permitted. This would allow clients to feel that they
173. Id.
174. Melton, supra note 47.
175. Id.
176. Don Thompson, California Jobless Rate Swells to 12.6 Percent,
MERCURYNEWS.COM, Apr. 16, 2010, http'J/www.mercurynews.com/search/ci-
14898013? IADID= Search- www. mercurynews. corn- www. mercurynews. com&
nclickcheck=1.
177. See Commission for the Revision, supra note 169.
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had a say in whether or not their attorney could represent an
adverse party. Consequently, such a requirement would
permit the former client to maintain the level of confidence
and trust in his or her attorneys, thus preserving the bedrock
values of the professional relationship. Clients would not
necessarily, however, have a duty to consent in reasonable
cases, so this proposal may result in unduly hindering
attorney mobility and the ability of subsequent client's to
have the counsel of their choice. Nonetheless, screening
would still be permitted in cases where consent was given.
Accordingly, more screening would be permitted with such a
rule than if no screening rule were in place, so it would
preserve the former client's trust and confidence in his or her
attorney while still allowing attorney migration where
consent was given.
Another way to give additional protections would be if
California prohibited screening where a migrating attorney
directly worked on a matter and then moved to the firm that
represented the former client's direct adversary in the same
matter. In such an instance, California would only allow for
screening where the attorney did not personally work on the
previous matter. This solution would better preserve the
public's confidences in the integrity of the system because
clients would be less likely to feel as if their attorney betrayed
them by switching sides to the proverbial "enemy."178
Because these types of conflicts are viewed as egregious, the
balance tips in favor of preserving public confidence in the
system and away from attorney interest. Prohibiting this
type of representation may be important to preserve the
public's confidence. Upon seeing an attorney change sides to
their client's direct adversary, people would likely believe
that the reason the attorney obtained a position with the
adversary's firm was a direct result of his or her
representation of the former client. 179
The ABA's Standing Committee's report acknowledges
178. The court in SpeeDee Oil referred to such conflicts as "patently
improper" and that it "suggests to clients-and to the public at large-that the
attorney is completely indifferent to [his or her] duty of loyalty and the duty to
preserve confidences." People v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371,
379 (Cal. 1999).
179. Such concerns may raise liability questions in the related field of agency
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that screening may not be effective in cases where an
attorney in litigation moves to the opposing party's law
firm. 8 0  It notes that in these situations, a court can
disqualify a firm when it is reasonable in the particular
circumstances for the former client to fear that a screen may
not be effective.""1 A rule that strictly prohibits an attorney
from switching sides during an action would, however,
provide a more bright line rule than allowing courts to rule on
such cases.
Another possible screening rule would permit screening
only where the confidential client information communicated
to the lawyer to be screened was unlikely to be significant in
the subsequent matter."2 This would allow greater attorney
migration than the aforementioned rule, which would never
permit screening in cases where the attorney switches sides.
Unfortunately, such a rule may be unworkable for two
reasons. First, it would likely lead to greater uncertainty for
law firms and attorneys when determining what any given
court may consider "unlikely to be significant in the
subsequent matter" because any such determination would be
subject to a judge's discretion.8 3 Second, it would require
courts to inquire into the nature of the confidential
information. As a result, such an inquiry into the confidential
information would defeat the purpose because it would lead to
the exposure of the client's confidential information. 8 6
V. CONCLUSION
On February 16, 2009, the ABA House of Delegates voted
226-191 to permit lateral lawyer screening.8 5 In doing so,
the ABA sought to provide the nation with a standard
approach to screening. Regardless of the ABA's momentous
decision to amend Model Rule 1.10, California continues to
march to the beat of its own drummer by not explicitly
recognizing the use of ethical screens in the private sector.8 6
180. See MUNDHEIM, supra note 55, at 11.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §
124(2) (2000); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b) (2002) (amended
2007).
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124(2)(a).
184. Wittman, supra note 5, at 1221.
185. GILLERS, supra note 11, at 10-11.
186. Id. at 213.
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It seems it is only a matter of time until California recognizes
the use of ethical screens in the private attorney context. 8 7
Two federal cases from 2008 acknowledged such a shift in
California law towards ethical screens, while noting that the
shift was not yet complete.18  Also, the economic crisis has
had a devastating effect on California attorneys who are left
with fewer choices as a result of a narrow rule that does not
permit screening in the private sector. 8 9
When California adopts the use of ethical screens, it is
likely that they will at least adopt the provisions of Model
Rule 1.10 given the State Bar's goal of unifying California law
with the ethical laws across the nation. 9 ° But California is
also likely to adopt some of the more stringent requirements
that various other states place on law firms in imposing
ethical screens due to its pro-client rules.' 9' First, California
could require both clients written informed consent to the
ethical screen. 192 Second, California could prohibit screening
either in situations where a migrating attorney directly
worked on the matter for the former client or where the
confidential client information communicated to the attorney
was likely to be significant in the subsequent matter.
Although it is time for California to allow for the use of
screening in the private sector, it is important to not unduly
infringe upon a clients expectation of loyalty and confidences.
In other words, it is up to the courts or the California State
Bar to enact a rule that balances the attorney's interest in
choosing his or her career, the client's interest in choosing his
or her counsel, the former client's interests, and the public's
confidence in the legal profession.
187. See supra Part III.C.
188. See Plumley v. Doug Mockett & Co., No. CV 04-2868, 2008 WL 5382269,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2008); All Am. Semiconductor, Inc. v. Hynix
Semiconductor, Inc., No. C 07-1200, 2008 WL 5484552, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
2008); see also supra Part III.B.2.
189. See supra Part I.
190. See supra note 170.
191. See supra note 107.
192. See supra Part IV.
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